

Handbook for Ohio Voter Activists



Art by Micah Wright, www.antiwarposters.com

Stop the Machines, Neo.

I hope you find the information herein useful as you try to persuade and educate BOEs, lawmakers, media and citizens about the woeful inadequacies of electronic voting. Watch for the Hand-Counted Paper Ballots initiative we will circulate next year, and contact me with any comments, suggestions or offers to volunteer in our collection of records or signatures, info booths, letter writing, and street actions. Rady Ananda rady.J30@gmail.com

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Electronic Voting in Ohio?

By Victoria Lovegren, Ph.D.

The deadline for counties in Ohio to decide whether to take money set aside by the Help America Vote Act to “upgrade” their voting systems has been extended. That is a good thing, because most election officials have not processed enough relevant information to make a wise decision. They have been inundated with sales pitches from vendors of electronic voting equipment, but have not heard “the rest of the story.”

Meanwhile, the public is confused by demonstrations of touch-screen and optical-scan machines which, for the most part, seem to work pretty well. They may or may not have heard the stories of vote-hopping, phantom votes, frozen machines or the many other malfunctions of electronic voting machines in the 2004 election. Yet salesmen say “Our systems are totally standalone; no wires; no modem. They are encrypted. They are certified and re-certified to standards above and beyond what HAVA requires.” And the public, not having the knowledge to discern a secure computer system from a hole in the ground, says “sounds good to me.”

I am a veteran computer scientist and systems analyst, and I know that these machines can be hacked. 95% of computer scientists and software engineers polled by the ACM computer society in 2004, say, because of the vulnerability of electronic voting machines, a physical audit trail is necessary when using them. (<http://campus.acm.org/polls>)

Many, as I did before Ohio’s “Recount” last December, feel that the audit trail is not only necessary, but sufficient to provide the checks and balances for election integrity. They think touch-screen voting devices are okay as long as they have a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT)--a paper receipt that the voter can inspect after making his/her selections. Ohio law, introduced by state senator Teresa Fedor, now requires VVPAT on all electronic voting machines used in Ohio elections beginning in 2006. But is VVPAT enough?

What is the purpose of the audit trail? Is it for the voter to examine and feel confident that his/her vote was captured properly? Unfortunately, though the voter may feel comforted, this paper record has nothing to do with the internal vote that will be counted.

The reason for the audit trail is for an audit-- a recount--a physical counting of some random sample of the permanent-record (paper receipt or ballot) votes. One might hope the votes on the permanent records would be hand-counted, compared with the machine counts, and, in the event of a discrepancy, the hand-counted totals would be the “official totals.”

This is NOT what happens in Ohio’s “Recounts.” No-one I know who participated in Ohio’s “Recount” in December 2004 felt a true audit occurred. Most were shaken,

insulted and angry that they had volunteered their time, energy and money for such a charade.

In Ohio's "Recount", only 3% of the precincts' ballots were hand counted. The "selected" precincts were picked by election officials up to several days in advance of the recount—not randomly chosen. Some of the precincts' ballots were pre-counted and NOT in the presence of witnesses. The fact that we even had a recount was a miracle, resulting from Herculean efforts by the Green and Libertarian parties, grassroots activists and concerned citizens who scrambled to raise the \$10 per precinct. The event was delayed and then rushed; people, anxious to get home for the holidays, were rooting for numbers to add up, etc. And future "Recounts", if permitted at all, will cost five times as much.

Ohio's broken Recount Procedures must be fixed, regardless of voting technology. The point I'm making here is "electronic voting machines—touch-screens and optical-scans—are vulnerable to hacking, and without a meaningful recount—the touch-screen VVPAT and the optical-scanned ballots --will not be hand-counted." There will be no audit.

Election officials are asking Ohio voters to embrace "faith-based" voting. They are asking this now, following a highly disputed election, when our voter confidence is lower than ever.

What can we do to ensure our votes will be accurately counted? Urge election officials to get informed--sponsor public hearings where we can hear from ALL sides of the issue—before spending millions of taxpayer dollars on electronic voting machines that are vulnerable to wholesale vote manipulation; machines that must be secured, guarded inside fortresses, refrigerated, serviced, configured, certified, upgraded and re-certified; machines that will create even longer lines at the polls, result in even more chaotic and bogus recounts, and further erode our voter confidence.

<http://www.petitiononline.com/evoting>

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Corporate Control of the Election Process

By John Gideon www.VotersUnite.Org and www.VoteTrustUSA.Org

June 15, 2005

Those who hold the sacred trust of overseeing the election procedures and voting systems in this country are an alphabet-soup of organizations. The National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS); the National Association of State Elections Directors (NASED), the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC), the Elections Assistance Commission (EAC); the Election Center.

What do these groups have in common? They either receive their funding from the vendors or are greatly influenced by those who do receive funding from the vendors. We can only hope that the EAC can resist the influence. The others haven't.

Who are these "vendors"? The vendors are the corporate face on our elections systems -- the for-profit companies that develop and sell the equipment used to run our elections. They are those who have the most to gain from the influence they buy through their donations and dues to the alphabet soup, and that influence is considerable. They include names like Diebold, Elections Systems and Software (ES&S), Sequoia Voting Systems, Hart InterCivic, Accenture, UniSys, Accupoll, and more. In fact they are all proudly named on the list of corporate affiliates of NASS.

The NASS Corporate Affiliates Program

How does a company become a "corporate affiliate." [1]

<http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30# ftn1 of the National Association of Secretaries of State, and what does it mean? According to a description of the NASS Corporate Affiliate Program, corporations can donate annual dues in the amount of \$20,000, \$10,000, \$5,000, or \$2,500. Those funds go directly into the coffers of NASS. And what do the corporations get for donating to this worthy cause?

"The NASS Corporate Affiliate Program is a savvy way to share ideas and build relationships with key state decision makers while supporting the civic mission of the association." [2]

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30# ftn2>

Build relationships with key state decision makers? In other words, unrestricted access to lobby the people who will be spending the taxpayers' money to buy new election equipment. The scale of this unrestricted access is directly, and openly, related to the amount of "dues" that the corporation pays to the program.

The Influence of NASS over NASED

The National Association of State Elections Directors (NASED) is not supported by outside dues. It is supported by members' dues and is loosely under the auspices of the Council of State Governments. However, NASED is very definitely influenced by the NASS, which openly invites influence by the vendors. In nearly every state the Secretary of State has responsibility over the administration of elections. Almost all the members of NASED work for their state's Secretary of State and serve at their pleasure. The members of NASED are also included in three out of four NASS conferences.

"NASED is proud and fortunate to maintain extremely positive relationships with both the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and the Election Center. In order to maintain those

relationships and to insure the continued sharing of information among members of each organization, NASED meets with NASS in the winter and alternates between NASS and The Election Center for its summer meetings." [3]
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30#_ftn3>

And who are the other attendees of these meetings? Of course the vendors get a place at the table so they can meet, greet, and treat the people who they hope will be their customers; the members of NASED. Those are important relationships because ultimately NASED decides the fate of the "vendors" product via testing guidelines that are written by the TGDC and approved by the EAC and implemented (or not) by NASED. [4]
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30#_ftn4>

The TGDC and Corporate Influence

The Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) is a committee formed jointly by the Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) and NASED.

This committee is in place for only one reason; to formulate new standards against which all voting systems will be tested. The new standards the TGDC develops will replace the 2002 standards.

In "Is the NIST Technical Guidelines Development Committee Working For You, the Voter?" [5]
<http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30#_ftn5
I describe how these new standards are being written in consultation with the vendors who have to build products that comply with the standards. It is highly apparent that the corporations are being given a heavy hand in the formation of the standards that they will be held to in the future.

NASS Attacks the EAC

The Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) is a federal agency set-up by Congress as part of the Help America Vote Act of 2002. The EAC is under-funded and under-staffed. The EAC is also under attack by NASS.

The Associated Press reported in February, 2005 that "the National Association of Secretaries of State approved a formal resolution that asks Congress to dissolve its oversight organization, the federal Election Assistance Commission, after the 2006 elections." [6]
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30#_ftn6>

Why would NASS want to see the EAC dissolved? They say it's because elections are a 'states rights' issue. They ignore the fact that Florida 2000 and most problems encountered in the 2004 federal election can be attributed to the poor or non-existent oversight of the members of NASS. They ignore the fact that elections are held for federal offices, and that if they had been administering elections well, Congress would have had no reason to establish the EAC.

If the EAC is dissolved, NASS will regain its previous power, and through NASS the corporations will gain even more say in how our elections are administered.

The Elections Center Teaches Ethics but Shows None

Much has already been printed about the Election Center and the organization's lack of ethics in taking contributions from the voting equipment vendors while at the same time giving advice and teaching ethics to county and state elections officials.

"The Election Center, which trains election workers and advises Congress and government agencies on election process issues, has taken donations from manufacturers of electronic voting

machines even as it has issued strong statements supporting the security of the machines." [7]
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30#_ftn7>

The Election Center also arranges conferences, sponsored by vendors, where the state and local elections officials who attend are inundated with propaganda from the vendors. In August, 2004, elections officials from all over the U.S. met in Washington DC where they were treated to a dinner cruise on the Potomac sponsored by Sequoia and a welcoming party underwritten by Diebold. The graduation and send-off party was sponsored by ES&S. [8]
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30#_ftn8>

The Vendors Purchase a Spokesman From the Disabled Community

Even the public face of the American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD), Mr. Jim Dickson, has admitted to being in the pocket of the vendors. Mr. Dickson has testified in favor of electronic voting machines and against paper-based voting systems before governmental panels, committees, and commissions across the country. However, he doesn't begin his testimony by saying that he receives money from the vendors for that testimony.

In an article in Wired News on October 12, 2004, journalist Kim Zetter reported:

"The government lobbyist for the American Association of People with Disabilities, who has traveled around the country testifying on behalf of touch-screen voting, acknowledged this year that his organization received at least \$26,000 from voting companies, but only after first denying it." [9] http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30#_ftn9

The Vendors Lobby Asks That Customers Buy Defective and Not Effective

Very recently another ingredient in the alphabet soup has spoken out. The Information Technology Association of America (ITAA); a coalition of, and lobbying agent for, voting equipment manufacturers; testified before the EAC that counties and states should not wait any longer for new standards, but should purchase their new election equipment now.

ITAA testified, "Under a best-case scenario, it will be difficult for states and counties to meet the HAVA deadlines for the purchase and implementation of accessible voting systems" [10]
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30#_ftn10

In other words, "Don't wait until new standards are set and the voting systems have been brought up to standards that may improve those systems. It is better to go out and purchase the equipment that is still being qualified to standards written in 1990. Buy defective and not effective."

What Must be Done to Counter the Vendors' Influence?

The voting machine corporations are spending millions to influence the decisions that relate to the qualification and sales of voting systems.

They are influencing the development of new voting system standards, whether those standards have to be followed, who buys what type of system, and every step in between. The vendors are in too much control. We can only wrest that control from the vendors by methodically putting out the facts to inform the misinformed and by reducing the vendors' influence on our decision makers.

The news from Miami-Dade County, Florida is a strikingly big step. [11]
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=30#_ftn11

The county supervisor of elections is recommending dumping the flawed and expensive electronic voting machines and returning to paper ballots -- in order to save the taxpayers' money.

With easy access to the county officials, through NASS, NASED, and the Election Center, vendor lobbyists managed to sell defective election equipment to Miami-Dade. Dedicated voting activists researched the facts and brought them forward with a determination that could not be ignored.

None of the alphabet-soup organizations could deny that what the activists were saying was true.

The activists were also aided by the fact that the county has a new elections director who had no hand in the decision to buy the DRE voting machines. Stepping into a new position, outside of vendor control and with no risk to his own credibility, he was able to declare that the county made a huge mistake and wasted millions of dollars of taxpayer's money.

If all our election officials were out from under the influence of the vendors, if they weren't defensive about poorly informed decisions they had made because of that influence, what would the face on our election system look like? Certainly it's worth finding out.

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- [1] 2005 NASS Corporate Affiliate Roster; <http://www.nass.org/corpaffiliates/roster.html>
- [2] NASS Corporate Affiliate Program; Pg. 4; http://www.nass.org/corp_brochure.pdf
- [3] "Conferences", National Association of State Elections Directors; <http://www.nased.org/conferences.htm>
- [4] "Is HAVA Being Abused?", by John Gideon and Ellen Theisen, VotersUnite.Org; <http://www.votersunite.org/info/hava-abuse1.asp>
- [5] Is the NIST Technical Guidelines Development Committee Working For You, the Voter? By John Gideon, <http://www.votetrustusa.org/blogs/nist&tdgc.htm>
- [6] "Election Officials Work on Making Changes" by Robert Tanner, Associated Press, February 8, 2005; <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2005/02/07/national/w121345S54.DTL>
- [7] "Group that called electronic vote secure got makers' aid", by Linda K. Harris, Philadelphia Enquirer, March 25, 2004; <http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/8273865.htm?1c>
- [8] "Diebold Wines and Dines Officials", by David Corn, blog in The Nation, August 26, 2004; <http://www.thenation.com/blogs/capitalgames?bid=3&pid=1708>
- [9] "Diebold and the Disabled", by Kim Zetter, Wired News, October 12, 2004; <http://wired-vig.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,65292,00.html>
- [10] "ITAA Warns Purchase Delays will Endanger HAVA Compliance", Press Release, Information Technology Association of America, May 26, 2005; http://www.ita.org/eweb/Dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=PRTemplate&wps_key=44e3eb88-23bf-43b1-be43-55b99ccdfcff
- [11] "Voting system change in Dade likely", by Noaki Schwartz And Tere Figueras Negrete, Miami Herald, May 28, 2005; <http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/11759284.htm>

**Contact Info for the 32 Counties
that Joined the ES&S v Blackwell suit**

BOEs have till 9/15/05 to decide which voting machine system to buy with HAVA money. The directors of 21 of these counties are Republican. For a complete list of Board members, see 05 BOE Contact Info uploaded to J30 files.

Citizens need to lobby these boards directly, in person, and as a team. Please ask them to reject all electronic machines and institute the most secure system: hand-counted paper ballots at the precinct.

**Allen, Auglaize, Brown, Champaign, Clermont, Clinton, Delaware, Fayette,
Franklin, Hamilton, Knox, Lake, Logan, Madison, Mahoning, Meigs, Monroe,
Noble, Ottawa, Pickaway, Preble, Putnam, Ross, Sandusky, Seneca,
Shelby, Summit, Tuscarawas, Union, Washington, Williams and Wyandotte**

Allen County Board of Elections (419) 223-8530 Fax (419) 222-0311
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204 N. Main St.
Lima OH 45201
allen@sos.state.oh.us

Auglaize County Board of Elections (419) 739-6720 Fax (419) 739-6721
Linda Householder, Director -Dem
209 S. Blackhoof, Room 205
Wapakoneta, OH 45895
lhouseholder@auglaizecounty.org
jburklo@auglaizecounty.org

Brown County Board of Elections (937) 378-3008 Fax (937) 378-6457
Sue McIntosh, Director -Dem
Administration Building
800 Mt. Orab Pk.
Georgetown, OH 45121
brown@sos.state.oh.us

Champaign County Board of Elections (937) 484-1575 Fax (937) 484-1578
Robin Burden, Director -Dem
1512 South U.S. Hwy 68, Suite L100
Urbana, OH 43078-9288
champaig@sos.state.oh.us

Clermont County Board of Elections (513) 732-7275 Fax (513) 732-7330
Danny D. Bare, Director -Repub
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Batavia, OH 45103
clermont@sos.state.oh.us

Clinton County Board of Elections (937) 382-3537 Fax (937) 383-3538
Lynne S. King, Director -Dem
46 S. South St., 1st fl.
Wilmington, OH 45177
vote@cinci.rr.com

Delaware County Board of Elections (740) 833-2080 Fax (740) 833-2079

Janet L. Brenneman, Director -Repub

140 N. Sandusky St.

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delaware@sos.state.oh.us

Fayette County Board of Elections (740) 335-1190 Fax (740) 333-3574

Pattiann Zinn, Director -Repub

133 South Main St., Ste. 404

Washington Court House, OH 43160

fayette@sos.state.oh.us

Franklin County Board of Elections (614) 462-3100 Fax (614) 462-3489

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Columbus, OH 43215-4572

franklin@sos.state.oh.us

Hamilton County Board of Elections (513) 632-7000 or 632-7015 Fax (513) 579-0988

John M. Williams, Director -Repub

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Knox County Board of Elections (740) 393-6716 Fax (740) 393-6717

Rita Yarman, Director -Dem

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Lake County Board of Elections (440) 350-2700 or 800-899-5253 x2700 Fax (440) 350-2670

Janet F. Clair, Director -Repub

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Painesville, OH 44077-0490

elections@lakecountyohio.org

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Court House, Rm. 1 - 101 S. Main St.

Bellefontaine, OH 43311

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Madison County Board of Elections (740) 852-9424 Fax (740) 852-7131

Paula Rafferty, Director -Dem

117 W. High St., Suite 102

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Ottawa County Board of Elections (419) 898-3071 Fax (419) 898-3146
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Pickaway County Board of Elections (740) 474-1100 or 474-8077 Fax (740) 477-2991
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Preble County Board of Elections (937) 456-8117 Fax (937) 456-2986
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Putnam County Board of Elections (419) 523-3343 Fax (419) 523-3417
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Ross County Board of Elections (740) 775-2350 Fax (740) 775-2383
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Seneca County Board of Elections (419) 447-4424 Fax (419) 443-7925
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Shelby County Board of Elections (937) 498-7207 Fax: (937) 498-7326
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Summit County Board of Elections (330) 643-5200 Fax (330) 643-5422
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Tuscarawas County Board of Elections (330) 343-8819 Fax (330) 343-3125
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Union County Board of Elections (937) 642-2836 Fax (937) 642-2823
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Marysville, OH 43040
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Ohio County by Vendor with Undecided Counties as of 1-July-05

COUNTY Map Key#	04 reported winner		Registered voters on 11-2-04	TECHNOLOGY	04 VENDOR	05 VENDOR (chosen as of 5-25-05 per ScS)	# units at 175 rpm after 5.93% purge	Cost incl. maintenance of Diebold DRE @ \$2,700 ea.	Category of EIR (partial listing)
ADAMS 31	BUSH		17,696	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE	95	\$256,834	Vote switch
ALLEN 16	BUSH		68,151	OPTICAL SCAN	ES&S	sued for ES&S	366	\$989,120	Vote switch
ASHLAND 49	BUSH		34,850	OPTICAL SCAN	TRIAD ES&S	Diebold DRE	187	\$505,801	
ASHTABULA 88	KERRY		62,926	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	ES&S PCOS	338	\$913,286	
ATHENS 61	KERRY		45,103	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	ES&S PCOS	242	\$654,609	
AUGLAISE 15	BUSH	WB	33,094	DRE	ES&S	sued for ES&S	178	\$480,315	Security; Vote switch; Tamper
BELMONT 78	KERRY		44,231	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE	238	\$641,954	Tamper - recount
BROWN 30	BUSH		28,922	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	155	\$419,764	Vote switch
BUTLER 8	BUSH		238,022	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE	1,279	\$3,454,570	unusual results; vote switch
CARROLL 81	BUSH		20,076	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	108	\$291,376	
CHAMPAIGN 25	BUSH		25,376	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	136	\$368,299	Vote switch
CLARK 26	BUSH		89,721	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	ES&S PCOS	482	\$1,302,180	Tamper - recount
CLERMONT 10	BUSH		125,832	OPTICAL SCAN	ES&S	sued for ES&S	676	\$1,826,283	Vote switch
CLINTON 28	BUSH		25,092	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	135	\$364,177	Vote switch
COLUMBIANA 82	BUSH		78,536	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	ES&S PCOS	422	\$1,139,845	
COSHOCTON 65	BUSH		22,679	Mixed and OPTICAL SCAN	TRIAD ES&S	Diebold DRE	122	\$329,155	Security
CRAWFORD 43	BUSH		29,591	OPTICAL SCAN	ES&S	Diebold DRE	159	\$429,474	Vote switch
CUYAHOGA 70	KERRY		1,005,807	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE	5,407	\$14,597,938	unusual results; ballot misdesign; targeted misinforma-tion; provisionals & registrations tossed
DARKE 6	BUSH		38,290	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	206	\$555,728	Vote switch
DEFIANCE 2	BUSH		25,849	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	139	\$375,164	Vote switch
DELAWARE 40	BUSH		100,676	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	sued for ES&S	541	\$1,461,177	Vote switch
ERIE 47	KERRY		55,517	OPTICAL SCAN	ES&S	ES&S PCOS	298	\$805,755	
FAIRFIELD 54	BUSH		91,498	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE	492	\$1,327,971	vote switch; tamper-recount
FAYETTE 35	BUSH		16,094	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	sued for ES&S	87	\$233,583	

COUNTY Map Key#	04 Reports d Winner		Registered voters on 11-2-04	TECHNOLOGY	04 VENDOR	05 VENDOR (chosen as of 5-25-05 per SoS)	# units at 175 rpm after 5.33% purge	Cost incl. maintenance of Diebold DRE @ \$2,700 ea.	Category of EIR (partial listing)
FRANKLIN 38	KERRY		845,720	DRE	DANAHER Guardian	Diebold DRE per SoS; but sued for ES&S	4,546	\$12,274,490	Vote switch; Security; Ballot misdesign; Machine shortages; Malfunction; Absentees rejected; Registrations tossed; Targeted misinforma-tion
FULTON 19	BUSH		28,561	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	154	\$414,525	
GALLIA 59	BUSH		23,568	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD & unknown add'l vendor	Diebold DRE	127	\$342,058	
GEAUGA 86	BUSH		65,396	OPTICAL SCAN	ES&S	ES&S PCOS	352	\$949,135	Vote switch
GREENE 27	BUSH		105,079	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	565	\$1,525,081	Vote switch; Security-recount; \$149.43 denied
GUERNSEY 74	BUSH		26,889	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	145	\$390,258	Recount-tamper
HAMILTON 9	BUSH		573,612	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	sued for ES&S	3,083	\$8,325,208	Vote switch; Malfunction; Shortages; Ballot misdesign; Provisionals tossed; Registrations tossed; Misinforma-tion felons; Intimidation
HANCOCK 22	BUSH		49,617	OPTICAL SCAN	ES&S	Diebold DRE	267	\$720,124	Vote switch
HARDIN 23	BUSH		18,921	OPTICAL SCAN or DRE	AVM DIEBOLD	Diebold DRE	102	\$274,613	
HARRISON 79	BUSH		11,475	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	62	\$166,544	Recount-tamper
HENRY 18	BUSH		19,685	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	106	\$285,701	
HIGHLAND 29	BUSH		28,243	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	152	\$409,909	Vote switch
HOCKING 55	BUSH	WB	18,209	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	98	\$264,279	Recount-tamper
HOLMES 66	BUSH		17,870	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	96	\$259,359	Vote switch
HURON 48	BUSH		39,352	PUNCH CARD	Diebold DRE	Diebold DRE	212	\$571,141	
JACKSON 57	BUSH		23,998	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	129	\$348,299	
JEFFERSON 80	KERRY		49,656	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD ES&S	Diebold DRE	267	\$720,690	registrations tossed

COUNTY Map Key#	04 Reported winner		Registered voters on 11-2-04	TECHNOLOGY	04 VENDOR	05 VENDOR (chosen as of 8-25-05 per SoS)	# units at 175 rpm after 5.33% purge	Cost incl. maintenance of Diebold DRE @ \$2,700 ea.	Category of EIR (partial listing)
KNOX 52	BUSH		36,972	DRE	TRIAD MICROVOTE	sued for ES&S	199	\$536,599	Security; machine shortages; unlikely registrations
LAKE 87	BUSH		160,196	DRE	TRIAD SEQUOIA	sued for ES&S	861	\$2,325,030	Security; Targeted misinforma-tion
LAWRENCE 58	BUSH		41,524	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	ES&S PCOS	223	\$602,665	Vote switch
LICKING 53	BUSH		111,387	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Tied	599	\$1,616,633	vote switch; undervotes
LOGAN 24	BUSH		29,406	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	158	\$426,789	vote switch
LORAIN 69	KERRY		196,601	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	1,057	\$2,853,400	Recount-tamper
LUCAS 20	KERRY	WB	300,137	OPTICAL SCAN	DIEBOLD	Diebold DRE	1,613	\$4,356,086	burglary; machine shortages & malfunctions; Recount- tamper
MADISON 37	BUSH		23,183	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	125	\$336,470	Vote switch
MAHONING 83	KERRY		194,903	DRE	ES&S	sued for ES&S	1,048	\$2,828,755	Software malfunction; machines jammed; Security; vote switch
MARION 41	BUSH		43,323	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	233	\$628,775	
MEDINA 68	BUSH		118,268	PUNCH CARD	FIDLAR	Diebold DRE	636	\$1,716,501	Vote switch
MEIGS 60	BUSH		15,205	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	82	\$220,680	
MERCER 5	BUSH		31,306	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	168	\$454,365	vote switch; undervotes
MIAMI 13	BUSH		72,169	OPTICAL SCAN	TRIAD ES&S	Diebold DRE	388	\$1,047,436	overvotes; vote switch; unlikely turnout
MONROE 77	KERRY	WB	10,350	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE per SoS; but sued for ES&S	56	\$150,216	Recount-tamper
MONTGOMERY 12	KERRY	WB	391,914	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	2,107	\$5,688,105	Undervotes
MORGAN 62	BUSH		9,358	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	50	\$135,819	
MORROW 51	BUSH		24,248	PUNCH CARD	FIDLAR DOUBLE- DAY	Diebold DRE	130	\$351,927	Vote switch
MUSKINGUM 64	BUSH		51,552	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	277	\$748,208	Recount-tamper
NOBLE 75	BUSH		8,879	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE per SoS; but sued for ES&S	48	\$128,867	

COUNTY Map Key#	04 Reports & Winner		Registered voters on 11-2-04	TECHNOLOGY	04 VENDOR	05 VENDOR (chosen as of 8-25-05 per SoS)	# units at 175 rpm after 5.33% purge	Cost incl. maintenance of Diebold DRE @ \$2,700 ea.	Category of EIR (partial listing)
OTTAWA 46	BUSH		30,334	OPTICAL SCAN	ES&S	sued for ES&S	163	\$440,257	
PAULDING 3	BUSH		14,226	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold PCOS	76	\$206,471	
PERRY 63	BUSH		23,480	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	126	\$340,781	Overvotes; unusual registrations
PICKAWAY 36	BUSH		30,045	DRE	TRIAD MicroVote	sued for ES&S	162	\$436,063	Vote switch; Security; Recount-tamper \$149.43 denied
PIKE 33	BUSH		19,655	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	106	\$285,266	
PORTAGE 84	KERRY	1	109,565	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	589	\$1,590,189	
PREBLE 7	BUSH		28,137	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	151	\$408,371	Vote switch
PUTNAM 17	BUSH		24,579	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	132	\$356,731	Vote switch
RICHLAND 50	BUSH		91,311	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE	491	\$1,325,257	
ROSS 34	BUSH		43,463	DRE	TRIAD MicroVote	sued for ES&S	234	\$630,807	Security
SANDUSKY 45	BUSH		39,407	OPTICAL SCAN	ES&S	ES&S PCOS	212	\$571,940	Overvotes
SCIOTO 32	BUSH		48,005	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold PCOS	258	\$696,728	
SENECA 44	BUSH		37,974	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	204	\$551,142	
SHELBY 14	BUSH		28,460	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	sued for ES&S	153	\$413,059	Vote Switch; Records discarded before recount
STARK 72	KERRY	1	267,939	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE	1,440	\$3,888,775	Provisionals tossed
SUMMIT 71	KERRY	5	368,858	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD VOTING TECHNOLOG	sued for ES&S	1,983	\$5,353,479	Undervotes
TRUMBULL 85	KERRY		142,436	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE	766	\$2,067,267	Overvotes
TUSCARAWAS 73	BUSH		55,656	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE per SoS; but sued for ES&S	299	\$807,772	
UNION 39	BUSH		30,200	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	sued for ES&S	162	\$438,312	Vote switch; Recount tamper
VAN WERT 4	BUSH		21,100	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	113	\$306,238	Vote switch
VINTON 56	BUSH		8,527	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	ES&S PCOS	46	\$123,758	
WARREN 11	BUSH		125,165	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD & unknown add'l vendor	ES&S PCOS	673	\$1,816,602	Secret vote count; Vote switch
WASHINGTON 76	BUSH		40,889	OPTICAL SCAN	ES&S	sued for ES&S	220	\$593,449	
WAYNE 67	BUSH		69,810	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold DRE	375	\$1,013,198	
WILLIAMS 1	BUSH		26,722	PUNCH CARD	ES&S	Diebold PCOS per SoS; but sued for ES&S	144	\$387,834	vote switch
WOOD 21	BUSH		90,688	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD	Diebold DRE	487	\$1,316,215	
WYANDOT 42	BUSH		15,834	PUNCH CARD	TRIAD and ES&S	ES&S PCOS	85	\$229,809	
			7,972,826				42,857	\$115,714,863	p.14

Danaher Controls - Danaher Guadian, Diebold Election Systems, Election Systems & Software, Fidar

2004 Vendors: Doubleday, MicroVote General Corp., Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc., Triad Governmental Systems, or Triad GSI, Voting Technologies International. AVM is given as the 2004 vendor for Hardin by the SoS, as well as Diebold.

Key No. Each county is numbered on any of various maps titled "RAmap-OH 04 Cnty by Vendor" as continually amended. In the pdf version, the map follows the detail of EIRs. (Amendments show fewer and fewer number of counties open to lobby efforts.)

WB - whistleblower; VPM - voters per machine; FP - Free Press; PCOS - Precinct Control Optical Scan.

Yellow fill - SoS info conflicts with confirmed info on which counties that have not yet selected their vendor and which joined the ES&S suit against the SoS. **Red-bolded counties have until 9-15-05 to select a voting system** with HAVA money. NOTE: Licking County did not join suit but had a tie vote on which system to buy.

"Cost Including Maintenance" figures provided by SoS are **highly suspect** and not aligned with other states who were charged nearly double for the Diebold TSx model and maintenance contract. The 1/20/05 Announcement Strategy memo from SoS Election Reform Director Judy Grady also suggests the contract prices are much lower than what counties will have to pay. The June 24, 2005 public records response from the SoS refused to disclose the current pricing figures on the grounds of proprietary confidential information which the SoS must protect. Obviously, this claim has no legal merit since the money being spent is taxpayer dollars - we have a right to know how much the SoS is paying for these hackable machines.

Sources:

Moss v Bush ("Moss v Bush") Ohio Supreme Court Case No. 04-2088; Cobb 12-23-04 motion in Federal court; Paul Harmon vs. Licking County (2005); John Conyers 1-5-05, Preserving Democracy: What Went Wrong in Ohio..., 6-10-05 "current" production of contracts, technology, 04 and 05 vendor selection, and other Public Records responses by counties and SoS. All data requested remains unproduced (60 days and counting) in violation of Ohio law. This spreadsheet supercedes previous versions since being updated with SoS-supplied info.

Prepared by Rady Ananda, J30 Coalition, Chair Research & Investigations, rev. July 1, 2005.

EIR Details

Adams - vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1186) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Allen vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (2312) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Auglaize (3) 1) Security: logic & accuracy tests not conducted on 11/2/04 before the vote began, therefore undetected, self-deleting, operating instructions could have tampered the vote results. Moss v Bush, Claim 87; 2) "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (3429) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94; 3) On 10/21/04 BOE Dep. Dir. tells of ES&S emp'ee accessing the main computer that creates the ballots and compiles election results. **Whistleblower Deputy Director Ken Nuss (D) forced to resign; Director Jean Burklo fired.**

Belmont - Recount tampering - Cobb 12-04 motion in federal court

Brown vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (2221) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Butler (2) 1) Unusual Vote Results: Dem candidate for State Supreme Court Chief Justice, C. Ellen Connally, received 59,532 votes. In contrast, the Kerry-Edwards ticket received only 54,185 votes, 5,000 less than Connally. Also, the victorious Repub candidate, Thomas Moyer, received approximately 40,000 less votes than the Bush-Cheney ticket. Further, Connally received 10,000 or more votes in excess of Kerry's total number of votes in five counties, and 5,000 more votes in excess of Kerry's total in ten others. Conyers' 12-4-04 letter to Blackwell. 2) vote switching - "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (23,392) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Champaign vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1165) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Clark - Recount-tamper. Tabulating software illegally altered before recount. Conyers 1-5-05 What Went Wrong.

Clermont vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (11765) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Clinton vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1756) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Coschocton - Security: questionable ballot security procedures 12-23-04 Cobb motion in Federal court

Crawford vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1969) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Cuyahoga (5): 1) unusual vote results: Ward 4F (AfAm) 41% voted for Constitutional Party - 215 of 526 votes and in Ward 4N (AfAm) 32% voted Libertarian - 163 of 502 votes (In 2000, combined total for 3d party for 4F & 4N was 8); Ward 8G (AfAm) Libertarian votes 51 vs 19 votes for Bush and in Ward 8I (AfAm) Constitutional Party votes 27 vs. 8 votes for Bush (In 2000, independent candidates received 9 votes from 8G and 8I.). 2) absentee ballot misdesign: arrows did not align with the correct punch hole. Moss v Bush claim 102. 3) Targeted misinformation. Dems told to go to wrong precinct. Moss v Bush Claim 103. 4) 8,099 provisionals tossed, e.g. 33% in 04 vs 17% in 00. Moss v Bush Claim 101. 5) 10,000 registrations tossed. Moss v Bush Claim 99.

Darke vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (3856) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Defiance vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1070) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Delaware vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (5354) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Fairfield (2) 1) vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (2110) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94; 2) Security-recount: illegal interference with machines. Cobb 12-04 motion in Federal Court.

Franklin (8): 1) vote switching Moss v Bush Claim 125. 2) Security: logic & accuracy tests not conducted on 11/2/04 before the vote began, therefore undetected, self-deleting, operating instructions could have tampered the vote results. Moss v Bush, Claim 87. 3) absentee ballot misdesign - arrows didn't align with correct punch holes. Moss v Bush Claim 104.; 4) Machine shortages - 39 never deployed and this info was withheld for 5½ weeks. AfAms had higher vpm ratios than whites. Moss v Bush Claim 105; 5) Machine malfunctions: Error messages generated by faulty cartridges despite being used on 11/2; discovered during recount. FP 12-18-05; 6) absentee voters suppressed: 1000s of students told to report to Columbus to verify legitimacy and Dems called challenging their legitimacy. FP 10-29-04; 7) Registrations tossed - felons. 3500 felons purges in 04 vs. usual purge of 200-300 per year. Non-felons purged. FP 10-29-04. 8) Targeted misinformation. Dems told to report to wrong precinct. Moss v Bush Claim 104.

Geauga vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (2269) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Greene (3): 1) vote switch - "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (4855) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94. 2) Security-recount - ballots left loose on tables in an unlocked, unguarded building, open to manipulation and theft, prior to a recount. FP 12-18-04. 3) §149.43 denied. FP 12-18-04.

Guernsey - Recount-tamper: Illegal interference with voting machines prior to the recount. Conyers 1-5-05 What Went Wrong & Cobb motion in federal court.

Hamilton (8): 1) vote switch: "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (7886) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94. 2) Malfunctions" ballots could not be fully inserted. Moss v Bush Claim 107. 3) Machine shortages - AfAms had higher vpm ratios than whites. Moss v Bush Claim 106. 4) absentee ballot misdesign - initially Kerry left off ballot. Moss v Bush Claim 107. 5) Provisionals tossed. Conyers 12-4 LT Blackwell. 6) Registrations tossed. FP 10-29-04. 7) Misinformation - felons told needed a Judge to sign order allowing them to vote. FP 10-29-04. 8) Intimidation: Republican precinct judges hassled voters about their address. Moss v Bush Claim 108.

Hancock vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (2863) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Harrison - Recount-tamper: Illegal interference with voting machines prior to the recount. Conyers 1-5-05 What Went Wrong & Cobb motion in federal court.

Highland vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1845) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Hocking - Recount-tamper: Illegal interference with voting machines prior to the recount. Conyers 1-5-05 What Went Wrong & Cobb motion in federal court. **Whistleblower Deputy Director Sherole Eaton (D) fired.**

Holmes vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1221) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Jefferson - Registrations tossed: irregularities in how challenged voters were notified their right to vote was lost; published in a nearly unreadable newspaper article. Moss v Bush Claim 109.

Knox (3) - 1) Security: logic & accuracy tests not conducted on 11/2/04 before the vote began, therefore undetected, self-deleting, operating instructions could have tampered the vote results. Moss v Bush, Claim 87. 2) Machine shortages in AfAm precincts - AfAms had higher vpm ratios than whites. Moss v Bush Claim 106. 3) unlikely registrations - 186 people registered at a college address; this practice rejected voters who did so at liberal Kenyon College, but allowed to be valid these 186 registrations at Mount Vernon Nazarene University

Lake (2) - 1) Security: logic & accuracy tests not conducted on 11/2/04 before the vote began, therefore undetected, self-deleting, operating instructions could have tampered the vote results. Moss v Bush, Claim 87. 2) Voters who registered thru Democratic & NAACP drives notified by mail on bogus BOE letterhead that they could not vote. Moss v Bush Claim 111.

Lawrence vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1320) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Licking (2) vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (3043) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94; 2) Paul Harmon v. Licking County uncovered unusually high number of undervotes which cost him the election.

Logan vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1892) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Lorain - Recount-tamper: Illegal interference with voting machines prior to the recount. Conyers 1-5-05 What Went Wrong &

Lucas (4) 1) Burglary- Lucas County Dem Party office burgled. Among the data on the stolen computer of the party's office manager were: e-mails discussing campaign strategy, candidates' schedules, financial information, and phone numbers of party members, candidates, donors, and volunteers. Also taken were computers belonging to a Lucas County Commissioner and to a Texas attorney working with the Kerry/Edwards presidential campaign to ensure election security. Toledo Blade 10-13-04. 2) Machine shortages in AfAm precincts - AfAms had higher vpm ratios than whites. Moss v Bush Claim 112. 3) Machines malfunctioned during testing. Moss v Bush Claim 112. 4) Recount-tamper Illegal interference with voting machines prior to the recount. Conyers 1-5-05 What Went Wrong & Cobb motion in federal court. **Three of the four BOE members fired.** FP 5-25-05.

Madison vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1237) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Mahoning (4) 1) Software malfunction: negative 25 million votes recorded for Kerry. Moss v. Bush Claim 114. 2) Malfunctions - 12 machines jammed on 11/2. Moss v Bush Claim 116. 3) Security: logic & accuracy tests not conducted on 11/2/04 before the vote began, therefore undetected, self-deleting, operating instructions could have tampered the vote results. Moss v Bush, Claim 87. 4) vote switching reported by numerous voters. Conyers 12-4-04 LT Blackwell; Moss v Bush Claim 115.

Medina vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1954) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Mercer (2) 1) vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (3748) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94. 2) Undervotes: On one machine, 289 votes were cast, but only 51 presidential votes were cast. Countywide, there was a 7% undervote rate. Moss v Bush Claim 117.

Miami (3) 1) Overvotes: 19,000 new ballots were added after all precincts reported, boosting President Bush's vote count to 33,039, or 65.77%, while Senator Kerry's vote percentage stayed exactly the same to three one-hundredths of a percentage point at 33.92%. Conyers 12-4-04 LT Blackwell. 2) vote switch: "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (4597) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush Claim 94. 3) Unlikely turnout: In the Concord Southwest Precinct, voter turnout was 98.55% and in the Concord South Precinct, voter turnout was 94.27%. Moss v Bush Claim 118.

Monroe - Illegal interference with voting machines; the 3% hand recount didn't match the election results so the recount was suspended and the machine was swapped by Triad. **Whistleblower Perry Apfelbaum**. Cobb motion in federal court.

Montgomery - undervotes: Of 284,650, 5693 didn't vote for president: 168 of 611 votes cast in Washington Twp, 27.5%, record turnout, but no vote for president. The percentages of undervotes were significantly higher in the 231 precincts that wound up voting for Kerry (2.8%) than did the 354 that wound up voting for Bush (1.6%). Moss v Bush Claim 119. **Whistleblower Shirley Wightman**, 40-yr pollworker.

Morrow vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1034) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Muskingum - Security: logic & accuracy tests not conducted on 11/2/04 before the vote began. Moss v Bush Claim 87

Perry (2) - 1) Overvotes: Sign-in book for the Reading S precinct indicates that 360 voters cast ballots in that precinct and there were 33 absentee votes cast. The precinct officially reported 489 votes were cast. ALSO, some voters' names have two ballot stub numbers listed next to their entries creating the appearance that voters were allowed to cast more than one ballot. ALSO, W Lexington G AB, 350 voters are registered yet 434 voters cast ballots. Perry County BOE claimed that, "due to a computer error," some votes were counted twice. Analysis shows that virtually every ballot was counted twice. ALSO, Precinct AAV, 266 voters signed in yet the BOE reported 393 votes were cast in that precinct, an overage of 133 votes. Conyers 12-4-04 LT Blackwell. 2) 91% voter registration, yet most have never voted and have no signature on file. Of these, 3,100 voters registered in Perry County on November 8, 1977. There was no federal election in 1977. Conyers 12-4-04 LT Blackwell.

Pickaway (3) 1) Security: logic & accuracy tests not conducted on 11/2/04 before the vote began, therefore undetected, self-deleting, operating instructions could have tampered the vote results. Moss v Bush, Claim 87. 2) Vote switch: "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1352) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94. 3) §149.43 denied during canvassing period after the vote.

Preble vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1575) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Putnam vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (2709) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Richland vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1689) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket..." Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Ross - Security: logic & accuracy tests not conducted on 11/2/04 before the vote began, therefore undetected, self-deleting, operating instructions could have tampered the vote results. Moss v Bush, Claim 87.

Sandusky - Overvotes: Clyde precinct had 131% voter turnout, 2600 votes counted twice when disc inserted twice into the tabulator. Moss v Bush Claim 120. ALSO, 9 other precincts some votes were counted twice. Moss v Bush Claim 121.

Shelby (2) - 1) Vote switch: "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (3853) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94 2) Records tossed before Recount: The BOE admitted, through a public records request, that data critical to a meaningful recount had been discarded, possibly illegally. FP 12-18-04.

Stark - Provisionals tossed: if cast in the wrong precinct (violates HAVA and past practices). Moss v Bush Claim 122.

Summit - Undervotes: 5,037 regular ballots uncounted per Dr. R.H. Phillips' analysis

Trumble - Overvotes: 106 of 274 precincts had an average of 5.5 Fraudulent Absentee Ballots cast- lacking notation in absentee logbook; if this trend prevailed in Ohio's 11,366 precincts - 62,513 overvotes cast. Moss v Bush Claim 83. ALSO, voter showed up to find someone had already signed into the poll book in her name - both ballots were allowed to be cast. Moss v Bush Claim 123. **BOE Director Norma Williams resigned** after complying with SoS directive to keep the poll books from public view. FP 5-25-05.

Union (2) - 1) vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (2240) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94. 2) Recount-tamper: Illegal interference with voting machines prior to the recount. Conyers 1-5-05 What Went Wrong & Cobb motion in federal court.

Van Wert vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1750) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

Warren (2) - Secret Vote Count: ballots counted in secret per "FBI order to lockdown" Moss v Bush Claim 124. 2) vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (12,750) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94.

Williams vote switch "...due to error, fraud or mistake at least (1389) votes were deducted from the total number of votes actually cast for the Kerry-Edwards ticket and added to the number of votes actually cast for the Bush-Cheney ticket... Moss v Bush, Claim 94

HOW TO WRITE A PRESS RELEASE [1]

Compiled by Rady Ananda

The news release is a vehicle for notifying the media and the public of upcoming events, new programs or changes in old ones ... information that will affect the public or that people should know. Effective news releases are easy to write if a few simple rules are followed.

This TIPS sheet sets forth guidelines for the format and use of news releases.

When to Issue a News Release

Most local news releases – city or countywide – will relate facts about the every day happenings of interest to citizens or business. Warning and community-solution type releases are usually issued by governmental authorities and all media outlets will print such releases.

Basic news releases such as these should not contain policy statements or discuss controversial issues.

To decide what's appropriate for a news release ask yourself: "What would I want to know about the cost, security, or auditability of a voting system?" (for example)

Controversial news releases, e.g. reporting a subverted certification process, requires prompt, accurate, information. Be sure to advise the journalist you will update with further details as you learn them, staying conscious of their deadlines.

You should not prepare statewide (or national) press releases unless you are part of some state or national policy team. You can hurt your reputation and may even harm the cause.

A Media Committee should be prepared and actively sending releases as policy requires – once a week (or more) during periods of heightened activity, and less frequently other times. It should also maintain a current list of mainstream and alternative news outlets, tailoring the message to the forum. Importantly, it should continually develop positive, working relationships with media contacts.

Keep policymakers apprised of positive and interesting stories, as well as updating them on news articles or releases that could potentially impact the VR movement. (Summaries of several related articles are most helpful.)

Timing is important, and so is your audience list. Modify your mailing list to fit the release.

General Guidelines for Writing a News Release

The purpose of a news release is to inform, not to entertain. It must present facts, not opinion, clearly, briefly, and completely within the generally accepted format to which the media is accustomed.

The news media, not the community, is the primary audience whose interest must be sparked. Whether your release is used depends on capturing the attention of the newsperson who reads it.

Be prepared to answer the "five Ws" – who, what, when, where, and why – and sometimes how. Ask yourself:

What is the purpose of this release?
What audience (beyond the newsperson) should be reached?
What are the most interesting (or most pertinent) aspects of this story?

All details such as spelling, figures, titles, full names, and locations should be verified.

A release should contain enough info so that it can be used without the newsperson calling back for more facts. Omission of basic facts could “kill” the story because s/he doesn’t have time to follow up. (Timing and appropriate medium are also important factors to them, as well as you.)

When your draft is written, ask yourself:

Have you explained fully but concisely?
Will your reader need more clarification or background?
Is the story choppy and disjointed, or does one point flow naturally into the next?

Have at least one other person check your release to make certain it is both clear and accurate.

Ten Steps to a Professional News Release

- 1. Write a release that will catch the attention of the editor or reporter who reads it.** This means the release will be interesting, clear, and factual without attempting to be clever or provocative.
- 2. Tell the most important part of the story in the first paragraph by incorporating the “five Ws”.** Usually this can be done in 3-4 lines that summarize the major points.
- 3. After the lead, elaborate on details in descending order of importance.** The paragraphs following the lead may be used to elaborate on info too detailed for the lead, to bring in additional significant facts, or to explain one of the “Ws”, usually **why**.
- 4. Brevity is the heart of the news business.** Most county-level releases should be written in under 40 lines. Use plain language and active sentences.
- 5. Keep the presentation simple and in accepted style.** See the News Release Style Sheet at the bottom of this How-To guide. At the end of your release, type and center one of the following:

-30-
-END-

When sending by fax or US mail, the second page of your press release should be plain white paper. Do not break a paragraph between pages. After the last full paragraph on the first page, type one of the following:

(MORE)
-MORE-

- 6. Be sure to include the name and contact info of the person the media should call for more information.** Ideally, both home and office numbers should be listed so reporters can reach you when they are working tight deadlines.

- 7. Stick to the facts without speculating or giving opinion.** Never editorialize. Also, be careful how points are emphasized and don’t overstate the particulars of a subject.

8. Don't use VR lingo. The public isn't familiar with PCOS, but is becoming familiar with DRE. If the release is not easily understood, it probably won't be used.

9. Attribute news to a responsible, personal source. Letterhead isn't a source. Attribute facts, opinions, or statements to a person who, by his or her title or expertise, is an authority qualified to make a statement. An organization doesn't make an announcement ... an official spokesperson for the org makes an announcement. Attribution is always desired.

10. Some stories require a follow-up. That will be especially true as each county chooses a voting machine vendor, or as laws are proposed, amended and voted on. Ties to corruption, malfeasance, dereliction of duty, etc., as they're exposed, are often continually updated.

After the release is out

An editor or reporter may like your release enough to give it special treatment and call for more information. Help the reporter by providing contact info for the right person to interview. Keep your notes and sources well organized and handy.

Some stories offer good opportunities for photographs, fact sheets, maps or other material to enhance the release.

Getting good coverage in a big city daily can be a challenge. You may wish to include a note to the reporter or editor to draw your release to his or her attention. Offer to provide assistance if a reporter is interested in the story. The easier you make it for reporters to write or cover your story, the more likely you are to get coverage.

Don't be a "news nuisance" making repeated calls to ask if and when your story will be used. Your chances of success are enhanced by your professionalism, not by your persistence on the phone.

Follow up on the way a story is treated and keep notes of which papers (etc) emphasize which points. Note the points that are cut. This will help you when following up with those media outlets or when you provide future releases.

News Release Style Sheet:

NEWS RELEASE (all caps, flush left)

For Release Monday, May 30, 2005 (underline this) -or-
For Release On or After April 14, 2005 -or-
For Immediate Release

Contact Name, 614.293.5000 (days)
614.299.6477 (eves)
rady@j30.info

2d Contact Name (when appropriate, e.g. one has technical info, other has public affairs role)

HEADING/TITLE IS CENTERED, ALL CAPITAL LETTERS, UNDERLINED, USUALLY
RESTRICTED TO TWO LINES; IDENTIFIES THE CONTENTS OF THE RELEASE, e.g.:

BLACKHEART SUBVERTS CERTIFICATION PROCESS
SELECTS HIGHEST CONTRIBUTING VENDOR TO HIS CAMPAIGN

Copy is double-spaced. The first sentence in each paragraph must be indented. Words should not be broken at the end of a line. The only exception is for compound words that normally use a hyphen. Do not break paragraphs between pages of a news release. See Item 5 above.

A successful news release sets forth essential facts of a newsworthy story, and is clearly and concisely written to attract the attention of the media. Try to communicate the most significant facet of the story, and send the finished product to the appropriate news people, offering further assistance. Whether the release is used is determined by a number of factors beyond the writer's control, and some within his or her control. Editors reject releases when they are not local, advertising in disguise, too long, too late, uninteresting, redundant, poorly written, if the information is suspect or the source can't be verified, and if it's not socially acceptable to media owners or their audience.

-MORE-

Blackwell Subverts Certification Process

Make it neat and crisp with no typos. White space in the heading is nice. When a story is cut, the end of the story is cut first. Answer the “five Ws” in the first paragraph. Only facts are stated; if you can’t verify something, leave it out.

Each org will have to determine its own distribution list, which must be tailored to the release. Send your news release to the editor or news director, addressing them by name, if possible. If you’re announcing an upcoming event, your news release should be sent one or two weeks before the event, so the media can plan to cover it. If it’s a follow-up release, get it to the editors as soon afterward as possible.

####

[1] Richard R. Jurin, PhD, *Communicating Natural Resources and Environmental Information*, Simon & Schuster, 1998. (I tailored this for voter rights activists from Jurin’s compilation of sources, predominantly, Fish & Wildlife Service, Office of Public Affairs. ~Rady Ananda, J30)

Voter Confidence Resolution

(v.7.0)

Whereas an election is a competition for the privilege of representing the people; and

Whereas each voter is entitled to cast a single ballot to record his or her preferences for representation; and

Whereas the records of individual votes are the basis for counting and potentially re-counting a collective total and declaring a winner; and

Whereas an election's outcome is a matter of public record, based on a finite collection of immutable smaller records; and

Whereas a properly functioning election system should produce unanimous agreement about the results indicated by a fixed set of unchanging records; and

Whereas recent U.S. federal elections have been conducted under conditions that have not produced unanimous agreement about the outcome; and

Whereas future U.S. federal elections cannot possibly produce unanimous agreement as long as any condition permits an inconclusive count or re-count of votes; and

Whereas inconclusive counts and re-counts have occurred during recent U.S. federal elections due in part to electronic voting devices that do not produce a paper record of votes to be re-counted if necessary; and

Whereas inconclusive results have also been caused by election machines losing data, producing negative vote totals, showing more votes than there are registered voters, and persistently and automatically swapping a voter's vote from his or her chosen candidate to an opponent; and

Whereas inconclusive results make it impossible to measure the will of the people in their preferences for representation; and

Whereas the Declaration of Independence refers to the Consent of the Governed as the self-evident truth from which Government derives "just Power";

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED:

Because inconclusive results, by definition, mean that the true outcome of an election cannot be known, there is no basis for confidence in the results reported from U.S. federal elections; and

BE IT ALSO RESOLVED:

Ensuring conclusive results is only one necessary step toward creating a new basis for voter confidence in U.S. federal elections. Additional reforms that would take further steps toward building voter confidence include:

- 1) direct election of the President and Vice President of the United States by the citizenry, and
- 2) voting processes owned and operated entirely in the public domain, and
- 3) clean money laws to keep all corporate funds out of campaign financing, and
- 4) a voter verifiable paper ballot for every vote cast and additional uniform standards determined by a non-partisan nationally recognized commission, and
- 5) declaring election day a national holiday, and
- 6) counting all votes publicly and locally in the presence of citizen witnesses and credentialed members of the media, and
- 7) ensuring the sanctity of voter privacy through law and practice. A decentralized database containing only such voter identification as to verify the voter appearing is the named voter, and
- 8) equal time provisions to be observed by the media along with a measurable increase in local, public control of the airwaves, and
- 9) presidential debates containing a minimum of three candidates, run by a non-partisan commission comprised of representatives of publicly owned media outlets, and
- 10) instant runoff voting (see H.R. 5293) and proportional representation to replace the winner-take-all system for federal elections;

Be it further resolved:

When elections are conducted under conditions that prevent conclusive outcomes, the Consent of the Governed is not being sought. Absent this self-evident source of legitimacy, such Consent is not to be assumed or taken for granted.

The permalink for the Voter Confidence Resolution is:

<http://quvwurld.blogspot.com/2005/04/voter-confidence-resolution.html>

Guide to the Voter Confidence Resolution

This is a guide to the strategy and talking points of the [Voter Confidence Resolution](#).

Has the Consent of the Governed been withdrawn, YET?

Premise

The [Voter Confidence Resolution](#) shows us that the Consent of the Governed, defined in the [Declaration of Independence](#) as the self-evident truth from which Government derives "just Power," is no longer being sought through elections in America. Unverifiable votes, privatized source code, and secret vote counting ensure inconclusive outcomes. If the results are inherently uncertain, we have no basis for confidence.

What's Next?

People in communities around the country are organizing and lobbying their City Councils to pass the [Voter Confidence Resolution](#). While the resolution is a template that should be customized somewhat in each community, these three frames should remain intact to generate a cumulative impact as more and more resolutions pass.

1. The way it works now we're guaranteed inconclusive outcomes and we'll never have unanimous agreement about election results.
2. The [Voter Confidence Resolution](#) contains a comprehensive election reform platform designed to ensure conclusive outcomes and create a new basis for confidence in U.S. federal elections.
3. Since the Consent of the Governed is not being sought, we ask: Has the Consent of the Governed been withdrawn, YET?

The benefit of cumulative impact means it is assumed we will eventually switch the answer to this question from no, to YES, the Consent of the Governed HAS been withdrawn. How many communities must pass this resolution for this point to be made?

The Big Picture

By uniting citizens on the community level, bridges are built across partisan divides. This consensus-building process will make it easier for any City Council to feel free to pass the [Voter Confidence Resolution](#) as a collective declaration. So begins the shift in the balance of power between We The People and the government gone awry (the very definition of revolution, according to Rebecca Solnit's ["Hope In the Dark"](#)).

Summary

Who: City Councils

What: Pass the [Voter Confidence Resolution](#), ask: Has the Consent of the Governed been withdrawn, YET?

Where: Communities all across America

Why: Election conditions ensure inconclusive outcomes and fail to seek the Consent of the Governed (and because peaceful revolution is a birthright)

When: Immediately; public hearing already scheduled for July 6, 2005 in Arcata, CA

~ Dave Berman, www.GuvWurld.org

THE 12 HOURS OF VOTING

By Marj Creech (J30), Rady Ananda (J30) & Dave Berman (GuvWurld)

In the first hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**DRE or OptiScan machine?**”

In the 2nd hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**Two stolen elections!** DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 3rd hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**Invalid recounts.** Two stolen elections! DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 4th hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**40 tampered smart cards;** Invalid recounts; two stolen elections. DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 5th hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**I WANT THE GOV’NOR’S SEAT...** damn those whistleblowers! Invalid recounts. Invalid recounts; two stolen elections. DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 6th hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**Democracy’s a-dying.** I WANT THE GOV’NOR’S SEAT... damn those whistleblowers! Invalid recounts; two stolen elections. DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 7th hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**Proprietary software,** so Democracy’s a-dying. I WANT THE GOV’NOR’S SEAT... damn those whistleblowers! Invalid recounts; two stolen elections. DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 8th hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**88 closed pollbooks,** proprietary software, so Democracy’s a-dying. I WANT THE GOV’NOR’S SEAT... damn those whistleblowers! Invalid recounts; two stolen elections. DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 9th hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**93,000 votes tossed,** 88 closed pollbooks, proprietary software, so Democracy’s a-dying. I WANT THE GOV’NOR’S SEAT... damn those whistleblowers! Invalid recounts; two stolen elections. DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 10th hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**Damn those whistleblowers!** 93,000 votes tossed, 88 closed pollbooks, proprietary software, so Democracy’s a-dying. I WANT THE GOV’NOR’S SEAT... damn those whistleblowers! invalid recounts; two stolen elections. DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 11th hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**11 votes per precinct,** 40 tampered smart cards, 93,000 votes tossed, 88 closed pollbooks, proprietary software, so Democracy’s a-dying. I WANT THE GOV’NOR’S SEAT... damn those whistleblowers! invalid recounts; two stolen elections. DRE or OptiScan machine?”

In the 12th hour of voting, Blackwell said to me, “**12 ID pieces,** 11 votes per precinct, damn those whistleblowers! 93,000 votes tossed, 88 closed pollbooks, proprietary software, so Democracy’s a-dying. I WANT THE GOV’NOR’S SEAT... 40 tampered smart cards, invalid recounts; two stolen elections. DRE or OptiScan machine?”

Get involved. Stop the Machines. Subscribe: <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/J30/>

Democracy is not something you believe in or hang your hat on, but something you do. You participate. If you stop doing it, democracy crumbles and falls.

~ Abby Hoffman